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of interest that I take in a guinea-pig-idea, or a potato-idea. Yet, even as psychologist I finally bring the results of my research to some Smith or other for his judgment. Psychology itself exists only as a social possession; it is a multiple experiencing. When I read psychological publications I always assume a second experiencing to which my present experience attributes value. I take the same attitude toward the individuals upon whom I make experiments. And if, from all these minds, I construct the notion of mind-as-such, or experience-in-general, the result is a curious one—my attention merely passes back and forth between the standpoint of myself as this particular psychologist and the standpoint of an ideal psychologist.

The conclusion is: (1) That the experience of having a friend involves valuing an object as experiencing. (2) That such valuing includes, and is the source of, our certainty of other minds. (3) That when psychology seems to translate our naïve social consciousness into experience without experiencers, it really does nothing of the sort, but at most substitutes for one set of experiencers another set of them, namely, psychologists, actual and ideal, together with *Versuchspersonen.* (4) That functional psychology errs when it treats consciousness as merely an instrument of adjustment; we adjust ourselves *to* it, not merely *through* it.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Problem of Individuality. Hans Driesch. London: Macmillan and Company. 1914. Pp. ix + 84.

The problem of individuality can hardly be said to be materially advanced toward solution by the little book for which it furnishes the title; that is, for readers who are acquainted with the author's Gifford Lectures of a few years ago. Half its space is, indeed, devoted to the defense of the neo-vitalist thesis that the secret of the organic individual is to be found in some immaterial, teleologically active, inherent agent,—"entelechy" or "psychoid"—but no new arguments are introduced, nor is there even any consideration of the criticisms of the theory which have appeared since the publication of "The Science and Philosophy of the Organism."

As before, the need of a kind of soul in the organism is maintained on three grounds: (1) The nature of what the author calls a "harmonious equipotential system"—in the blastula, for example—in which each element is equally able to play any single part in the formation of one totality (p. 14). "*Jedes jedes kann.*" That is, if the blastula is mutilated, *no matter in what part,* the remaining cells are capable of producing a complete individual; which shows that the several cells are not fully specialized in potency and function, but in harmony with their fellows are capable of discharging functions which ordinarily they would not have assumed. Now, these changes, in strong contrast with the mechanico-determinist order of things, appear to be due, not at all to changes in external conditions, nor to any corresponding or adequate change of internal conditions, but to the changed relations of the parts to the whole and the end. It is concluded that the rigid specialization which characterizes a machine does not exist in the blastula. (2) The nature of a complex-equipotential system, such as the egg, which develops by thousandfold fission from a single cell (its *Anlage*). Now, if the egg is really merely a very complex machine, and the development of the individual from it is due solely to its disintegration, which is conceivable, how are we to account for the presence of the organic machine in the egg? It would seem that it could come only from the *Anlage.* This, however, is not conceivable, says Driesch, for a machine can not be cut in two a thousand times and still remain a machine. (3) The nature of individual action, which as a response to stimulus is characterized as a "correspondence among totalities"; that is, not a one-to-one correspondence of a given item of action with each equivalent item of stimulus, as in the notes of a piano under the player's touch, and as is required for a completely mechanical process, but one where the stimulus is received *as a whole* (in a sense unified) and responded to by a unified act which takes its type from the organizing activity of a "basis of reaction" (the brain) which "has been made from without"—through contingent conditions in experience. If personal activity were purely mechanical, its items of conduct should be very miscellaneous, and severally unorganized and characterless, seeing that their sources, both in the stimuli of the present environment and in the cortical registrations of past heterogeneous experiences, are so decidedly miscellaneous. But such is not the case; each act has a purposive, conative unity of its own, imposed upon it, we must believe, by some agency in the organism (the "psychoid") which has already imposed an apperceptive and appreciative unity upon the stimulus. "The acting man . . . is not a stage actor [still less a phonograph]. *He is the sovereign of the results of his personal history;* his history affords him only *means* of future acting, and nothing more" (p. 30).

It doubtless behooves a layman to speak with caution of the pleas of so noted an authority in biology; but, as regards the first argument, it is proper to point out that some embryologists, C. N. Child and J. W. Jenkinson, for example, challenge Driesch's sweeping conclusion that systems such as the blastula are absolutely equipotential. The subdivision, they affirm, "can not continue indefinitely, . . . there is always, sooner or later, a restriction of potentialities, and this is due to the manner of distribution *ab origine* of the constituent parts of the whole."[1] "The correct proportionality of the organs of partial larvæ, then, offers no peculiar difficulty;" for the "causal harmony," which for Driesch is the significant thing in equipotentiality, may well "be given in the initial structure of the egg, and, if that may be divided, then the 'causal harmony' may be divided, too."[2]

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[1] Jenkinson: "Experimental Embryology," page 291.

As to the logic of the second argument, even a layman is able to see that Driesch makes no distinction between a single mechanism and a mechanical situation, or aggregate, though he is, of course, quite familiar with the difference between a *morphological* preformation in the egg and a physico-chemical one. It is truly enough inconceivable that a *single* machine—say, a watch—should continue to be a machine after its division and repeated subdivision. Such a machine is an individual, and *qua* individual is indivisible. Dividing it destroys it. A mechanical situation, however, a physico-chemical aggregate, for example, is, or may be, a group or congeries of mechanisms, and one finds no difficulty in thinking of such a congeries as capable of division without loss of character,—that is, the mechanical structure of its parts. A double seidlitz-powder combined in the dry state may certainly be divided an indefinite number of times without in the least destroying the power of the parts to react in its characteristic mechanical way under the stimulus of water. Whether an egg is a single machine or a mechanical aggregate is a question of fact for the cytologist to determine.

The third argument seems much the weightiest, and to many will doubtless be conclusive; yet there are physiologists who do not despair of reducing even conduct to purely mechanical terms. Accepting this argument as valid, however, on its negative side, that is, as disproving any purely mechanical account as an adequate explanation of intelligent behavior, it still does not appear why we are obliged to posit Driesch's immaterial "psychoid." It is no new thing to find the concept of mechanism less extensive than existence. It is some time since Mach pointed out that mechanism is neither the whole of reality, nor any part of it, but an aspect of it, albeit a very important aspect. Applying this principle to any given material system, it evidently follows that proof that there is something more than mechanism in the system is no proof at all that that something more is immaterial. It may well be matter in another aspect. The implied disjunctive assumption that what is not mechanical is immaterial appears to be unwarranted. Indeed, our author's use of disjunctive reasoning is the side of his work with which the critical reader is likely to feel most discontent.

The third lecture is devoted to "The Logic of Vitalism," which, we are told, is a part of his "general theory of becoming." It is chiefly occupied with topics on the metaphysical side of the logical field, among which are identity and change (becoming), "Nature," wholeness, teleology, and causality. The last named category is divided into (1) *singular causality* which, with its one-to-one correspondence, is essentially mechanical and the logical outcome of which is the principle that "The degree of manifoldness of a natural system can not increase from itself," and (2) *unifying causality,* which he postulates to account for the numberless increases of manifoldness, not due to external influences, actually found

[2] *Id.*, page 292.

in the organic world. Under unifying causality, in order to account for the "progressive complication" in the phylogeny, he finds a place for Aristotle's generic individual, and even discovers in history signs of a "suprapersonal unity" in human society.

The last of the four lectures is a metaphysical inquiry rather than a plea. It is concerned with the possibility of a "monism of order"—"the doctrine that the universe is one ordered whole." This idea, he concludes, is in conflict with the facts so long as the "whole" is regarded in Spinozian fashion as spatial throughout, "every characteristic of the Absolute" having "a spatial symbol." It is quite possible, however, our author thinks, "that the world of experience proper *can* only give us a fragmental knowledge of absolute Reality," since there may be therein "innumerable qualities which are not spatially symbolized and are therefore unknowable." "Therefore, from our piecemeal experience we can never say whether there be not a monism of order in the Absolute."

Driesch himself is unable to accept such a faith monism, though he regards the denial thereof as involving renunciation of the "fulfilment of logical postulates" and total inability to solve the problem of evil. These conclusions illustrate afresh our author's tendency to argue from disjunctives which are not true exclusives. It is assumed that the metaphysician is shut up to a choice between monism and agnosticism. Pluralism is not even noticed. Notwithstanding, however, his confessed lack of metaphysical belief Professor Driesch regards his neo-vitalism as logically legitimitizing a faith monism in those to whom it is possible. He says, "Our vitalism . . . violates the Spinozian dogma, also, for it looks upon Nature as something which can not be comprehended under spatial symbolism" (p. 77). "It is no longer necessary to look upon spatial data as a strange image of the Absolute in its completeness and then to be disappointed with this strange image. There *is not* a complete 'image' of the Absolute in space" (p. 78).

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The Ego and Its Place in the World. CHARLES GRAY SHAW. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. 523.

This book, the author's "retort to the world," analyzes that world into appearance, activity, and reality, and then construes the phenomenal world in the light of esthetics as the place of joy, the causal world by means of ethics as the place of work, and the substantial world after the manner of religion as the place of truth.

The analysis involves a discussion of the problem of traditional metaphysics, enriched by the contents of art and science, ethics and religion; and the purpose of it all is to obtain a higher synthesis of material already obtained by investigation and analysis. Reality is found "to consist of something graded, so that there is reality in appearance, still more reality in activity, while its full nature is found in the substantial."

Though this "dialectic," as the author likes to call his book, has grown out of university lectures, one must not imagine that it is to be read